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Recent  research  on risky  decision-making  in  adults  has  shown  that
both  the risk  in  potential  outcomes  and  their  valence  (i.e.,  whether
those  outcomes  involve  gains  or losses)  exert  dissociable  inﬂuences
on  decisions.  We  hypothesised  that  the  inﬂuences  of these  two
crucial  decision  variables  (risk  and  valence)  on  decision-making
would  vary  developmentally  during  adolescence.  We  adapted  a
risk-taking  paradigm  that  provides  precise  metrics  for the  impacts
of  risk  and  valence.  Decision-making  in 11–16  year  old  female  ado-
lescents  was  inﬂuenced  by  both  risk  and  valence.  However,  their
inﬂuences  assumed  different  developmental  patterns:  the  impact
of  valence  diminished  with  age,  while  there  was  no developmen-
tal  change  in  the  impact  of risk. These  different  developmental
patterns  provide  further  evidence  that risk  and  valence  are  fun-
damentally  dissociable  constructs  and  have  different  inﬂuences  on
decisions  across  adolescence.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Value based decision-making involves an agent choosing from several alternatives based on the
subjective values of available options. Two powerful inﬂuences on such decisions are risk in potential
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outcomes (Harrison & Rutstroem, 2008; Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996) and valence, meaning whether
those outcomes involve gains or losses (Dayan & Seymour, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Risk
can be deﬁned as a state in which the decision-maker lacks precise knowledge about which outcome
will follow from a decision – there is uncertainty. Individuals may  be risk-averse (preferring lower
risk options when comparing options with identical expected value (EV)), risk-neutral, or risk-seeking
(preferring higher to lower risk options). Valence is deﬁned as whether potential outcomes entail
punishment (e.g., ﬁnancial losses or painful electric shocks) or rewards (e.g., ﬁnancial gains or tasty
foods). The goal of the present study was to investigate the development of responses to these two
crucial decision variables, risk and valence, from early- to mid-adolescence (aged 11–16 years).
1.1. The effect of valence on decisions in adolescence
We  were particularly interested in the development of the impact of valence on decision-making,
prompted in part by a recent study that investigated valence-dependent reversal learning in response
to unexpected reward and punishment in adolescence (Van der Schaaf, Warmerdam, Crone, & Cools,
2011). Younger adolescents (age 10–11) displayed better reversal learning scores following a pun-
ishment than following a reward, and this difference in performance decreased with age across
adolescence (from age 10 to 16). We  investigated whether there is a similar development in the effect
of valence on risky decision-making in early to mid-adolescence.
1.2. Development of risk-taking in adolescence
Previous studies have suggested that different aspects of risky decision-making show differ-
ent developmental patterns (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). Developmental trajectories of risk-taking
behaviour differ depending on whether decisions are made in an affective or “hot” experimental
context (e.g., when emotions are involved or peers are present) or a non-affective or “cold” con-
text. In affective contexts, there is evidence that risk-taking peaks in mid-adolescence. A peak in
reward-sensitivity in mid- to late adolescence (14–21 years) was  found on a modiﬁed version of the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Cauffman et al., 2010). Participants in the IGT choose among four packs of
cards, each associated with different proﬁles of monetary gain and loss (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio,
& Anderson, 1994). Two packs are apparently lucrative but eventually result in signiﬁcant loss (disad-
vantageous packs). The other two packs are “steady earners,” with small wins hardly ever penalised by
even smaller losses (advantageous packs). Adults tend to sample the disadvantageous packs initially
but then settle on the advantageous options. Cauffman and colleagues (2010) designed a modiﬁed
version of the IGT in which gambling decisions were made about a particular deck on each trial,
which enabled assessment of decision-making in response to gains or losses. There appeared to be
a linear, age-related increase in the tendency to avoid the disadvantageous packs over the course of
the task. However, compared with younger adolescents and adults, mid- to late adolescents learned
more quickly to play from the advantageous packs, suggesting that this age group shows a heightened
sensitivity to approaching rewards (Cauffman et al., 2010).
In a study employing a gambling task designed to induce relief or regret (Burnett, Bault,
Coricelli, & Blakemore, 2010), a quadratic relationship emerged between age (9–35 years) and
risk-taking, which peaked in mid-adolescence (around age 14). In a further study, adolescents
(age 14–19) and adults (age 20+) played a card game in which cards could be turned over as
long as gains were encountered, but as soon as participants received a loss the trial terminated
(Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009a). Compared with adults, adolescents exhibited sub-
optimal decision-making, failing to consider value and probability information when making decisions
in an affective but not a non-affective version of the task. In a follow-up experiment, 10-year olds per-
formed at a level similar to adults, suggesting that risk-taking in affective contexts peaks in adolescence
but does not change in a non-affective context (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009b).
In other gambling tasks where feedback is given but the context is non-affective, there is no
evidence of a mid-adolescent peak in risk-taking; instead these tasks show a gradual decrease in
risk-taking or no developmental change (Paulsen, Platt, Huettel, & Brannon, 2011; Rakow & Rahim,
2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). In a non-affective task in which participants aged 8–18 chose
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between a sure outcome and a gamble option (either high- or low-risk), risk-taking decreased across
adolescence. Older adolescents chose low-risk gambles more frequently than high-risk gambles, and
this difference was smaller in younger participants (Crone, Bullens, Van Der Plas, Kijkuit, & Zelazo,
2008). These studies suggest that risk-taking peaks in mid-adolescence in an affective context, while
risk-taking remains stable or decreases in a non-affective context. However, it must be noted that
the distinction between affective versus non-affective contexts is not always straightforward, which
could lead to inconsistencies in the literature, especially because different studies employ different
paradigms, age ranges, sample sizes, and measures of risk-taking.
While the affective context of decision-making tasks has been modulated in previous developmen-
tal studies, one aspect of decision-making that has not yet been examined is the differential impact
of valence and risk. We  use a non-affective task to isolate the effects of risk and valence on decisions
(and developmental change in those effects), without studying how they interact with emotion.
1.3. Independent effects of valence and risk on decision-making in adults
The proposal that the impacts of risk and valence might show different developmental patterns
is predicated on recent research suggesting that risk and valence have independent effects on adult
decision-making (Wright et al., 2012). The prevailing view in psychology and economics has been
that risk and valence are related in a speciﬁc fashion, with risk-aversion occurring for gains and risk-
seeking for losses, given medium to high probabilities for both gain and loss outcomes (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). An alternative hypothesis is that valence and risk exert independent inﬂuences
on decisions in gambling tasks (Wright et al., 2012). This alternative hypothesis was  motivated by
evidence that multiple, interacting neural valuation systems inﬂuence decisions (Dayan, 2008), with
processing of risk and valence by distinct neural systems being consistent with independent, rather
than linked, behavioural effects. Behavioural and neurobiological evidence for a dissociation between
the inﬂuences of risk and valence on decisions has been derived from studies that employed a ﬁnancial
gambling task that separately manipulated risk and valence (Wright et al., 2012).
1.4. The present study
We  adapted the ﬁnancial gambling task used by Wright et al. (2012) to obtain precise metrics
for developmental changes in the impacts of risk and valence during adolescence (age 11–16). We
ﬁrst investigated whether adolescent decision-making is inﬂuenced by both risk and valence and
next examined whether these inﬂuences are independent of one another. We  then asked whether
the inﬂuences of risk and valence on decision-making show different developmental patterns during
adolescence. Developmental change was possible in the impact of either risk or valence, or of both,
on decisions in this non-affective risk-taking task.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Sixty-four female adolescents (mean age 13.9 years, range 11–16 years) took part. Data from three
participants were excluded (two were unable to complete the task and one confused the buttons). All
were recruited from the same academically selective secondary school in North London and were well
matched for educational background and socioeconomic status. Participants were individually tested
in a quiet classroom at their school.
Verbal IQ was assessed with the BPVS II (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) for all but seven
participants (whose verbal IQ could not be assessed due to time limitations at the school). Verbal IQ
was not associated with age (mean = 114.28, SD = 13.38, range 82–138;  ˇ = 0.002, r2 < 0.001, p > 0.9)
and covarying verbal IQ did not affect any of our experimental results. Due to sex differences in brain
maturation (Giedd et al., 1999), we tested only female participants.
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Fig. 1. Experimental design. In each trial, participants were instructed to choose between a lottery and sure option. The lottery
was represented by a pie chart with three segments corresponding to the three possible outcomes, with the size of each
segment corresponding to the probability of that outcome occurring. The sure option was indicated on the upper right side of
the  screen. Half the trials involved winning points (“gain” trials) and half involved losing points (“loss” trials). (a) In each gain
trial,  participants chose either to accept a lottery (three varying possible outcomes, all ≥0) or reject it in favour of a sure gain of
four points. (b) In each loss trial, participants chose either to accept a lottery (three varying possible outcomes, all ≤0) or reject
it  in favour of a sure loss of four points.
2.2. Pretest of stimulus understanding
We  ﬁrst employed a validity check to ensure that participants understood basic information dis-
played in pie chart stimuli. Participants saw eight printed pairs of pie charts, and for each pair were told
they should try to win as many points as possible (in the gain trials) or lose as few points as possible (in
the loss trials) by choosing one of the two  pie charts. We  tested understanding of gains and losses (four
pairs of pie charts contained only gains and four only losses), magnitudes (in four pairs, magnitudes
differed while probabilities were identical between the two pie charts), and probabilities (magni-
tudes were identical and probabilities differed). Previous work has shown that 5-year olds understand
simple probabilities (Schlottmann, 2001), and 8-year olds understand how risk and reward outcome
contribute to a gamble’s EV (Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008). As expected, all participants
met our inclusion criterion of over 75% accuracy (mean correct responses = 96.7%, SD = 6.4%).
2.3. The gambling task
Participants completed a computer-based ﬁnancial gambling task based on the “accept/reject” task
used by Wright et al. (2012). In the “accept/reject” task used here (Fig. 1), participants performed 112
trials presented in random order, of which 56 were gain trials (all possible outcomes ≥0), and 56 were
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loss trials (all outcomes ≤0). In each trial, participants chose to accept either a lottery (with three
possible outcomes) or a sure outcome (a gain of four points in gain trials, and a loss of four in loss
trials). Each trial began with a ﬁxation cross presented for 1–2 s (mean = 1.5 s), followed by a display
of the options for 5 s. Finally, a black square appeared to signal that participants had 2 s to indicate
their decision by pressing a button. Participants were informed that not responding resulted in the
worst possible outcome, corresponding to zero points in the gain trials and loss of eight points in the
loss trials. The 112 trials were split into two blocks of 56 trials, with each block lasting approximately
8 min. No feedback was given.
We  manipulated risk by using a set of 56 lotteries (three possible outcomes, all ≥0), in which
we parametrically and orthogonally manipulated degree of risk (i.e. variance; eight levels) and EV
(seven levels). In adapting the paradigm for a younger age group it was not possible to fully control
for skewness (a further aspect of risk), which ranged between −40 and 40 in the current sample. Half
the lotteries had an EV above the sure amount, and half were below it. We  presented each lottery in
this set once to produce 56 gain trials. To manipulate valence, we  multiplied all outcome amounts by
−1 to produce 56 loss trials (i.e., all outcomes ≤0, and a sure option of −4). This created a set of gain
trials and a set of matched loss trials.
Participants were told to treat the points as currency, at an exchange rate of one point equal
to 50 pence. Participants began the testing session with an endowment of eight points. After the
experiment, one gain trial and one loss trial were picked at random, and their outcomes were
added to this endowment to determine a ﬁnal payment. Participants could receive 0–16 points,
which at the end of the task were converted into GBP (i.e., £0–8). Participants also received £1 for
participation.
2.4. Stimulus sets
We  generated a set of 56 lotteries by orthogonally manipulating the variance (8 levels; mean = 7.5,
range 0.9–14.4) and EV (7 levels; mean = 4.0; range = 2.2–5.8) of the lottery. We  created this stimulus
set in two stages. First, we generated a list of every possible trial within the following constraints: each
lottery had three outcomes (three pie chart segments); outcomes were between 0 and 8 points; the
smallest allowable probability was 0.1 (to avoid probability distortion); and the smallest allowable
probability increment was 0.05. Next, we selected the 56 trials that most closely matched our desired
eight levels of variance and seven levels of EV.
2.5. Data analysis
Expected value of half the lotteries was above the sure amount and half below (mean EV across all 56
trials was equal to the sure option in both gain and loss trials). Thus, the proportion of riskier decisions
was used as a metric of participants’ risk preference (PropRisk: risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-averse < 0.5;
risk-seeking > 0.5). To derive an individual measure for the effect of valence on decisions, the impact
of valence was calculated as the difference in proportion of riskier decisions between gain and loss
trials (ImpValence = PropRiskgain − PropRiskloss). Wright et al. (2012) used the same metrics for risk
and valence.
We  used these participant-derived parameters in two  separate analyses. First, we assessed whether
adolescent decision-making is inﬂuenced by both risk and valence. To examine whether risk inﬂu-
enced decisions, we performed a one-sample t-test to assess whether overall PropRisk (PropRiskall
i.e., collapsed across gains and losses) was signiﬁcantly different from 0.5. To examine whether
valence inﬂuenced decisions, we performed a one-sample t-test to assess whether ImpValence was
signiﬁcantly different from 0. Second, we used regression analyses to determine whether these
inﬂuences on decision-making are independent and whether they show different developmental
patterns during adolescence. To examine whether the effect of age on valence was  distinct from
that of age on risk, we performed a forced entry multiple regression with age and PropRiskall
(proportion of riskier decisions collapsed across gain and loss trials) as predictors and ImpValence
(the difference in proportion of riskier decisions between gain and loss trials) as the dependent
variable.
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Fig. 2. Risk and valence both inﬂuenced decisions, and individuals’ preferences for both were not associated (a) Individuals were
signiﬁcantly risk-averse overall (PropRiskall < 0.5) as opposed to risk-neutral. Valence (ImpValence = PropRiskgain − PropRiskloss)
also  signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced decisions, with more gambling for gains than losses. (b) Individuals’ preferences related to risk
(PropRiskall) and valence (ImpValence) were not associated. Error bars indicate standard error. ***p < 0.001.
3. Results
3.1. Task performance
Participants performed the task well, with non-response rates (total 2.1 ± 2.8%, gains 1.6 ± 2.9%, losses 2.6 ± 3.2%) similar
to  levels previously reported in adults (Wright et al., 2012), and not associated with age (  ˇ = 0.007, r2 < 0.001, p > 0.9).
3.2. Risk and valence inﬂuence decisions
We  ﬁrst examined whether both risk and valence inﬂuence decisions. Half the lotteries had an EV above the sure amount and
half  below (mean EV across all 56 trials was  equal to the sure option with both gains and losses), which provided a simple metric
of  risk preference for each participant indexed as the proportion of riskier decisions made (PropRisk; risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-
averse < 0.5; risk-seeking > 0.5). Individuals were, on average, signiﬁcantly averse to risk (PropRiskall = 0.44 ± 0.10) as opposed
to  risk-neutral, t(60) = −4.9, p < 0.001 (Fig. 2a).
We  also extracted a simple metric for the impact of valence for each participant from the difference in riskier decisions
between gain and loss trials (ImpValence = PropRiskgain − PropRiskloss). Individuals were also sensitive to valence (ImpVa-
lence = 0.12 ± 0.13), t(60) = 7.3, p < 0.001 (Fig. 2a). Individuals selected the riskier option more frequently in gain trials than
in  loss trials (PropRiskgain = 0.50 ± 0.12; PropRiskloss = 0.38 ± 0.12), t(60) = 7.3, p < 0.001. Participants were risk-neutral with gains,
t(60) = −0.04, p > 0.9, and risk-averse with losses, t(60) = −8.0, p < 0.001. In sum, both risk and valence inﬂuence decisions, as has
previously been shown with adults (Wright et al., 2012).
We  next asked whether risk and valence had independent impacts on decision-making using regression analysis. Consistent
with previous adult data (Wright et al., 2012), the impacts of risk and valence on individuals’ decisions were not associated
with  each other,  ˇ = −0.02, r2 < 0.001, p > 0.8 (Fig. 2b).
3.3. Developmental changes in the inﬂuences of risk and valence on decisions
Finally, we asked how the impacts of risk and valence on decisions changed with age. Our data revealed that the inﬂuences
of  risk and valence show different developmental patterns (Fig. 3). The inﬂuence of risk on decisions did not change with
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Fig. 3. The impacts of risk and valence have different developmental patterns. We asked how the impacts of risk (PropRiskall)
and  valence (ImpValence) on decisions changed with age. (a) The inﬂuence of risk overall (PropRiskall) did not change with age.
(b)  The impact of valence (ImpValence) decreased signiﬁcantly with age.
age,  ˇ = −0.04, r2 = 0.001, p > 0.7 (Fig. 3a). In contrast, the impact of valence on decision-making decreased with age,  ˇ = −0.30,
r2 = 0.09, p = 0.02 (Fig. 3b).
To demonstrate that the effect of age on valence was  distinct from the effect of age on risk, we  performed a forced entry mul-
tiple regression with age and PropRiskall as predictors and ImpValence as the dependent variable. Age, as a single independent
variable, signiﬁcantly predicted ImpValence,  ˇ = −0.30, r2 = 0.089, p = 0.02. When PropRiskall was added as a second indepen-
dent  variable, the effect of age on ImpValence remained signiﬁcant,  ˇ = −0.30, p = 0.02. PropRiskall did not predict ImpValence,
ˇ  = −0.03, r2 = 0.001, p > 0.8. The change in the impact of valence during adolescence was not driven by a change in responses
to  either gains or losses alone, with neither PropRiskgain,  ˇ = −0.20, r2 = 0.04, p = 0.13, nor PropRiskloss,  ˇ = 0.13, r2 = 0.02, p > 0.3,
signiﬁcantly predicted by age.
4. Discussion
We  have demonstrated that risk and valence inﬂuence decision-making in 11–16-year-old female
adolescents. The degrees to which risk and valence impact individuals’ decisions are not related, con-
sistent with previous data for adults (Wright et al., 2012). Moreover, the inﬂuences of risk and valence
show different developmental patterns across the age range studied: While the impact of risk did not
change with age, the degree to which valence inﬂuenced decisions diminished with age (Fig. 3).
4.1. Risk-taking in adolescence is stable in this non-affective task
Previous work has suggested that the development of risky decision-making in affective and non-
affective tasks varies during adolescence. Several studies have reported a peak in risk-taking in mid-
adolescence for affective tasks, such as those involving emotions (Burnett et al., 2010; Cauffman et al.,
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2010; Figner et al., 2009a; Figner et al., 2009b), whereas non-affective tasks demonstrate either no
change or a decrease in risk-taking with age (Crone et al., 2008; Figner et al., 2009a; Figner et al., 2009b;
Paulsen et al., 2011; Rakow and Rahim, 2010). In the present study, we adapted a non-affective task
used by Wright et al. (2012) to dissociate the inﬂuences of risk and valence on decision-making in
adults. Adolescents were risk-averse in this gambling task, meaning that they made fewer riskier
than safe decisions. We  also demonstrated distinct developmental patterns in the impacts of risk and
valence during early to mid-adolescence.
Developmental stability in risk-taking between early and mid-adolescence has been reported in
previous studies examining risky decision-making in a non-affective task (Figner et al., 2009a). In
contrast, tasks employing an affective context often ﬁnd evidence for a peak in risk-taking around
mid-adolescence (Burnett et al., 2010; Figner et al., 2009a). Our results support those by Figner et al.,
suggesting that, in the absence of affective task components, the propensity to take risks does not
change during adolescence.
4.2. The impact of valence declines across early to mid-adolescence
Adolescent decisions were inﬂuenced by valence, such that fewer riskier decisions were made for
losses than for gains. The effect of valence on risky decision-making decreased across adolescence:
Compared with mid-adolescents, younger adolescents were more biased away from the riskier option
by losses relative to gains. This effect was  not driven by a change in responses to gains or losses
alone; thus, the decrease in the effect of valence could be explained by a symmetrical reduction of the
difference between risky decisions in the gain and loss domains. This would suggest that the effect
does not derive from younger adolescents more frequently choosing the computationally simpler
option in each trial. In a previous study requiring adolescents to learn to select advantageous decks of
cards and to avoid selecting disadvantageous decks, there was  an age-related increase in the propen-
sity to avoid the disadvantageous decks over the course of the experiment (Cauffman et al., 2010).
Older participants learned more quickly to avoid playing the disadvantageous decks; this was inter-
preted as an increase in loss-aversion during adolescence. In contrast, the reduction in the impact
of valence during adolescence seen here is consistent with a recent study examining changes dur-
ing adolescence in the effect of valence during a probabilistic reversal learning decision task (Van
der Schaaf et al., 2011). In that study the effect of valence on decisions declined with increasing age
(from 10 to 16 years), such that younger adolescents displayed greater sensitivity to unexpected
ﬁnancial losses compared to unexpected gains than did older adolescents. Thus, the developmental
change in the effect of valence seen in our gambling task might reﬂect more general developmental
changes in the inﬂuence of such approach-avoidance processes on decisions (Van der Schaaf et al.,
2011).
4.3. Distinct developmental patterns of the impacts of risk and valence
Our ﬁnding provides a new source of evidence in a debate between models of risky economic
decision-making. The prevailing view in psychology and economics is that risk and valence are related
to each other in a speciﬁc fashion (risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses for the proba-
bilities used in the current task), and that these preferences arise as the product of a utility function
concave for gains and convex for losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
An alternative neurobiology-based hypothesis is that valence and risk exert independent inﬂuences
on economic decisions (Wright et al., 2012). This hypothesis is supported by behavioural evidence for
a dissociation between the inﬂuences of risk and valence on adults’ decisions, and by neural evidence
for dissociable neural substrates related to the manipulations of valence and risk in orbitofrontal and
parietal cortices, respectively (Wright et al., 2012). Our ﬁnding that the effects of risk and valence
show different developmental patterns during adolescence is readily accommodated by neurobio-
logical models where multiple, interacting neural decision-systems contribute to decision-making
(Dayan, 2008). For example, decision-systems themselves (or those regulating the balance between
them) might develop differently across adolescence. Further, these neurobiological models expand
upon existing risk-return models of risky decisions (Bossaerts, 2010; Markowitz, 1952), which do not
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include effects of valence. We  found adolescent participants were more risk-averse for losses than
gains, which parallels the ﬁndings by Wright et al. (2012) and contrasts with other studies, which
often report that participants are risk-seeking in the loss domain and risk-averse in the gain domain,
for the probabilities used in this study (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This difference could be due
to the format of the tasks. For each trial in the present study, participants considered whether to
accept a lottery or reject it in favour of a sure option; when the lottery contains losses this could
induce participants to avoid it. When instead individuals were asked to evaluate and select one of
two options, they could not express avoidance by withdrawal but could potentially avoid losses by
selecting the riskier option. Such a variant of our task used with adults (Wright et al., 2012) showed pre-
cisely this reversal in the direction of the valence effect (i.e., more gambling for gains than for losses).
With respect to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), while our data do not support the
‘reﬂection effect’ (i.e., risk-seeking with losses and risk-aversion with gains), an approach-avoidance
account is consistent with ‘loss aversion’ where losses have greater weight (‘loom larger’) than
gains.
4.4. Limitations and implications
As noted earlier, changes to the task format can change the direction of the effect of valence. Future
developmental studies could examine the effects of valence and risk on decisions in other paradigms
and other domains of risky decision-making – for example, in mixed gain-loss gambles. This study
used simple metrics of the proportion of risky decisions made. Future work could also dissociate the
developmental trajectories of responses to speciﬁc components of risk, such as variance and skewness,
which have both been shown to inﬂuence adults’ decisions (Symmonds et al., 2011).
Despite the developmental change in the inﬂuence of valence over adolescence, collapsing across
age, adolescents show similar impacts of risk and valence as found in adults (Wright et al., 2012).
Therefore, adolescents and adults might generally use similar strategies when making risky decisions
in a non-affective context. One explanation for the gradual decrease in the inﬂuence of valence during
adolescence is a developmental shift in cognitive strategies used to make decisions in the kind of task
employed here.
The previous study with adults employed two  versions of the task. In one, for each trial there was
a ﬁxed evaluation period before the decision period (as in the present study). In the other, individuals
were free to respond at any point the stimuli were displayed. There was  no difference in the effects of
risk or valence across these two versions of the task for adults (Wright et al., 2012), but we have not
examined whether this is true for adolescents.
We  intentionally avoided including an affective component in our task, so that we  could study the
effects of risk and valence on decisions without the inﬂuence of emotion. Future studies could examine
how an affective context (for example, the presence of peers) interacts with the inﬂuence of risk and
valence on decisions.
In sum, we  show that the impacts of risk and valence on decision-making in a non-affective context
show different developmental patterns. While the inﬂuence of risk does not change with age, the
impact of valence decreases during adolescence. We  speculate that these results may  have implications
for public health policy. Types of public health information provided, and the way information is
presented, should be tailored to speciﬁc age groups to maximise impact. Parsing the inﬂuences on
risky decisions and understanding how they develop will help determine which to stress for a given
age group. Framing something as a loss, for example, may  be more effective with younger than older
adolescents.
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